In contrast to the well-known quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, which encode secret bits in non-orthogonal states, orthogonal-state-based protocols for QKD transmit secret bits deterministically. Even though secure, such a protocol cannot be used to transmit a secret message directly, because an eavesdropper is not prevented from learning something about the direct message before being detected. A quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) scheme satisfies this stronger security requirement. In this work, we study the relationship between security in QKD and QSDC. We show that replacing qubit streaming in a QKD scheme by block-encoding of qubits, we can construct a QSDC scheme. This forms the basis for reducing the security of a QSDC scheme to that of aQKD scheme, in the sense that if the latter is secure, then so is the QSDC scheme built on top of it. We refer to this as block reduction. Further, we show that the security of QKD reduces to that of QSDC, in the sense that if a QSDC protocol is secure, then by sending a random key as the direct message, the corresponding QKD protocol is also secure. This procedure we call as key reduction. Finally, we propose an orthogonal-state-based deterministic key distribution (KD) protocol which is secure in some local post-quantum theories. Its security arises neither from geographic splitting of a code state nor from Heisenberg uncertainty, but from post-measurement disturbance.
Introduction
A protocol of secure quantum key distribution (QKD) was proposed in 1984 by Bennett and Brassard 1 . Since then several other QKD protocols have been proposed 2,3,4,5,6,7 , and the notion of security has been considerably refined and strengthened. It is now established that QKD is unconditionally secure, while by contrast any classical cryptographic protocol is secure only under some assumptions about the hardness of performing some computations. This important feature (unconditional security) of QKD drew the attention of the cryptography community. However, all the initially proposed protocols of secure quantum communication 1,2,3,4 were based on conjugate coding (i.e., encoding bits using non-orthogonal quantum states), and the applicability of these initial protocols was limited to QKD. It was soon realized that quantum resources can be used to implement other cryptographic tasks and that it is possible to construct protocols of secure quantum communication using orthogonal states.
Specifically, on the one hand, conjugate-coding-based protocols were proposed for quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) a 8,9,10 , quantum secret sharing 11 , quantum dialogue 12,13 etc. while on the other hand, a few protocols with orthogonal-state-based quantum cryptography were proposed 5,6,7 . As in the case of conjugate-coding-based protocols, the initial protocols of orthogonal-state-based quantum communication 5, 6, 7, 14, 15 were also limited to QKD.
To be precise, in 1995, Goldenberg and Vaidman 5 proposed first orthogonalstate-based protocol for deterministic QKD (called GV). In 1997, Koashi and Imoto 16 generalized the GV protocol and proposed a protocol similar to GV protocol, but which obviates the random sending time, a strict requirement of the original GV. Subsequently, in 1999 Guo and Shi 6 proposed an orthogonal-state-based protocol of QKD which was based on the principle of quantum mechanical interaction-free measurement 17 . Recently, in 2009, Guo and Shi's idea was extended to a sophisticated orthogonal-state-based counterfactual QKD protocol by Noh 7 , which is now famously known as N09 or the counterfactual protocol of QKD. Later on, in 2010 Sun and Wen have proposed a modified N09 15 which is more efficient than N09.
All these orthogonal-state-based protocols 5,6,7,14,15 that were proposed between 1995 to 2010 were only theoretical ideas and limited to QKD. The interest on these protocols considerably increased in the recent past as several experimental realizations of orthogonal-state-based protocols of QKD were reported between 2010 to 2012 18,19,20,21,22 . Motivated by these developments, in last two years, a In a QKD protocol, a key is distributed first using quantum resources and then the key is used later for encryption of a message, whereas no such intermediary key is required in QSDC, which uses quantum resources to enable legitimate users to communicate directly without establishing a key. Further, a QSDC scheme does not require any classical communication for decoding of the information. There exists another class of schemes for direct secure quantum communication (i.e., quantum communication without an intermediary generation of key) which require additional classical information for decoding of the encoded information. Such schemes are referred to as deterministic secure quantum communication (DSQC).
some of the present authors extended the existing protocols of orthogonal-statebased QKD to obtain orthogonal-state-based protocols for quantum key agreement (QKA) 23 , QSDC 24,25 , DSQC 26 , counterfactual certificate authentication 27 , etc.
In most of our recent works on orthogonal-state-based secure quantum communication, we have used multi-qubit states and block transmission after applying a permutation operator Π on the qubits to be transmitted. Specifically, Π scrambles the order of particles. This procedure of permutation of particle (PoP) was first introduced by Deng and Long in 2003 28 to propose a protocol of "controlled order rearrangement encryption" (CORE). A detailed description of this technique and a short review of the orthogonal-state-based protocols that use this technique can be found in Refs. 29, 30 . Our recent works using PoP and multipartite orthogonal states suggest that any cryptographic task that can be performed using conjugate coding can also be performed by solely using orthogonal states 29 .
This observation in general and successful construction of orthogonal-statebased QSDC 24,25 protocol in particular lead to a couple of questions: (i) How is the security of QSDC protocols connected to that of QKD protocols? (ii) Is it possible to design orthogonal-state-based protocols of secure quantum communication in local post-quantum theories (say, in generalized local theory (GLT), generalized probabilistic theory (GPT) or in a generalized non-signaling theory (GNST)) 31 ? (iii) Is it possible to design orthogonal-state-based quantum device independent protocols of QSDC and QKD.
The present paper aims to answer the first two questions. In what follows, we answer the first question and show that we can construct a QSDC scheme by replacing qubit streaming in a QKD scheme with block-encoding of qubits. This reduces the security proof of the QSDC scheme to the security proof of the QKD scheme, in the sense that if the QKD scheme is secure, then so is the QSDC scheme built on top of it using PoP. This reduction scheme is referred to as block reduction. Similarly, it is shown that the security proof of a QKD scheme reduces to that of a QSDC scheme, in the sense that if we have a secure QSDC scheme, then we can always distribute a random key in a secure manner using that scheme. This reduction procedure is referred to as key reduction. Further, we answer the second question by providing an orthogonal-state-based deterministic QKD protocol which is secure in some post-quantum theories (namely in GPT, GLT or the local part of GNST) and note that security of the orthogonal-state-based protocol valid in post-quantum theories arises not from uncertainty, but from post-measurement disturbance.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 we describe block reduction, while in Sec. 3 we obtain the corresponding feature in the opposite direction, i.e., key reduction. In Sec. 4, we show that orthogonal-state-based protocols of secure communication can be designed in local post-quantum theories, too. Specifically, the possibility of orthogonal-state-based secure communication in a GLT and in local part of a GNST is established. Finally we conclude the paper in Sec. 5.
Block reduction
Recently it was shown how the use of block transmission and an orderrearrangement technique can make an orthogonal-state based deterministic twoqubit QKD protocol suitable for QSDC 25 . The QSDC protocol presented there: (a) Alice prepares 3N singlet states. Of these she applies a PoP scheme Π on N pairs together with 2N singlet halves. (b) She transmits these re-arranged 4N particles to Bob over an authenticated quantum communication channel. (c) After Bob acknowledges their receipt, she reveals the information to unscramble the N full pairs transmitted to Bob, who measures these in the Bell basis to determine the error rate e by a public discussion with Alice. If the error rate is too high, they abort the protocol run. (d) Alice encodes a 2N h(e)-bit message into a classical error correcting [2N, 2N h(e)]-code, and encodes this onto N of the remaining 2N qubits by quantum dense-coding. Here h is the Shannon binary entropy. Alice transmits these 2N qubits to Bob. (e) After Bob's acknowledgment, Alice identifies the check pairs, which are then used to confirm that the error rate remains not larger than e. Upon confirmation, Alice reveals the information that would allow Bob to pair the remaining N particles with their partner particles, in order that the message may be decoded.
A QKD scheme is secure if there is a real number e 0 such that 0 ≤ e 0 ≤ 1 and the observed error rate e satisfies e ≤ e 0 ⇒ I(A : B) ≥ I(A : E).
(
This ensures that if Eve is restricted only to attack the (memoryless) communication channel (and the devices and initial states, both of which are assumed to be well characterized), then Alice and Bob can extract some secret bits via key reconciliation and privacy amplification 32 . The idea behind Eq. (1) is essentially the information-vs-disturbance trade-off in quantum information theory. In a QKD protocol, Alice generates a random classical bit or dit (a d-level number) s j . She encodes the bit (or dit) in an entangled state |φ (j) S and streams (i.e, sequentially transmits) N such entangled states to Bob. Eve prepares probe P j in the initial state |ψ P . When Alice's system S j is transmitted towards Bob, Eve executes the interaction U between P j and S j , producing the entangled state
where |Φ S = j |φ (j) and |Ψ P = |ψ ⊗N . Based the subsequent classical communication between Alice and Bob, Eve measures ρ
P in a suitable basis to extract information about s j . Here U is optimal in the sense that it maximizes Eve's information about classical secret s j for a given observed error rate e.
In the PoP-version (P Π ) of a cryptography protocol P, because the streaming is replaced with block-coding of qubits, Eve does not know during their transit which entangled particles are partnered with which. She replaces probes P j and with a single master probe P ′ , and replaces U with U ′ , a unitary that interacts all N qubits with P ′ . Here the primes indicate corresponding quantities in P ′ . Since the PoP-version is the same as the old protocol with particle re-arrangement, therefore to gain the same amount of information, Eve must generate a greater level of system-probe entanglement to accommodate the various permutation possibilities, and correspondingly effect greater channel noise. For any fixed I(A:E) = I ′ (A:E), the error rate e ′ generated in the PoP version will be greater than e. Conversely, for a fixed error e = e ′ , we must have I ′ (A:E) < I(A:E). On the one hand, this means that the error threshold (e ′ 0 ) till which P Π remains secure as a QKD protocol will be larger, i.e., e 
which may be contrasted with the QKD condition (1). Since I ′ (A : E) asymptotically vanishes, Alice can directly encode her message, allowing the sender to use a QSDC protocol instead of a QKD protocol.
Our result implies that given a QSDC protocol (P Π ) obtained via replacing stream transmission by block transmission in a QKD protocol P, then if P is secure, so is P Π asymptotically at the threshold error rate determined by P, which may be represented as follows:
where S asserts the security of its argument, and the subscript B indicates reduction (to be differentiated from logical implication). This reference of the security of QSDC to that of QKD is block reduction, to be contrasted with another form of reduction, described below.
Key reduction
Given a secure QSDC scheme P Π , it is obvious that it can be converted into a secure QKD scheme, by transmitting a random key instead of a message. Of course, we must assume that the key itself is truly random and not vulnerable to attacks like the known-plain-text attack, etc. This thus gives a situation that is converse to (4), which we represent as
meaning that the security proof of QKD reduces to that of QSDC. Broadly, we interpret 'A > K B' as a reduction scheme where we derive a secure A if we have secure B plus a secure random number generator. With a slight modification, the above argument can be extended to a quantum key agreement (QKA) protocol 23 . QKA is a quantum key distribution scheme in which Alice and Bob must both contribute equally to the final key. In 23 we have already established that under certain conditions any protocol of QSDC can be turned in to a protocol of QKA. We can express this situation by
Thus, we can reduce the security proof of a QKA scheme to that of a QSDC scheme, provided that the QKA, QKD and QSDC protocols are related in the ways stated above.
Deterministic key distribution in local post-quantum theories
GPT is an operational framework 31 that allows us to comparatively describe a wide class of theories, including classical mechanics, quantum mechanics and postquantum theories of the box-world type 33 . Here 'operational' means that we do not concern ourselves with the state space (such as Hilbert space), but instead only with the vector space of probabilities that can be obtained by performing fiducial measurements on allowed states in a theory. A set of fiducial measurements M = {µ = 0, 1, · · · , µ = K} is a minimal and sufficient set whose outcome statistics completely specify the state. Therefore, a state in GPT is specified by the probability vector obtained under different fiducial measurements, µ = 0, 1, · · · , J, with outcomes α = 0, 1, · · · , K:
. . .
where P (α = k|µ = j) is the probability that measuring µ = j yields outcome α = k. Normalization requires ∀ j J α=k P (α = k|µ = j) = 1. In classical mechanics, any state can be specified with single fiducial measurement. For example, the state of a coin can be represented by the toss probabilities, as
where P (α = 0|µ = 0) is the probability of getting α = 0 (i.e., head), and µ = 0 is the measurement implemented by tossing. As another example, a classical particle requires specifying its position and momentum, but these two attributes can be considered as independent systems requiring a single fiducial measurement. By contrast, a (scalar) quantum particle requires two fiducial measurements: position and momentum. By measuring a qubit along X, Y , and Z direction, the state of a qubit can be fully represented, making these as three fiducial measurements for the state space of qubits in quantum mechanics. For example, the qubit with spin-up in the Z direction can be described by
where P (0|X) is the probability of obtaining spin up by measuring in the X direction, and so on. We note that P in Eq. (9) corresponds to a pure state in quantum mechanics. Now consider a local post-quantum theory-a GLT-with three fiducial measurements but a larger state space, in which pure states P have the form (9) and P (α = k|µ = j) is 0 or 1. A pure qubit is represented a mixture of such GLT pure states. A state in this GLT is called a gbit (for 'generalized bit').
The gbit can quite generally be of the type J-in-K-out, i.e., one with J fiducial measurements, each with K outcomes. Obviously, qubit is related most closely to a 3-in-2-out gbit. Let us consider a 2-in-2-out gbit, whose pure states are:
where the upper (lower) pair refers to the state in fiducial property 'X' ('Z').
An arbitrary gbit for our purpose is a convex combination of the above four elements. For example, the ±1 eigenstates of the qubit observable X would be mixed states of gbits:
A similar representation follows if we also include Y measurements in the picture, which we drop for simplicity. Each of the above states may be considered orthogonal in the sense that there is a measurement that deterministically distinguishes between any pair of them. E.g., g 0 and g 1 are distinguished by measuring Z, while g 0 and g 2 are distinguished by measuring X. These gbits lack Heisenberg uncertainty in that both X and Z can simultaneously take definite values. However, they admit post-measurement disturbance, whereby performing one fiducial measurement disturbs the statistics of the other fiducial measurements. For example, measuring X on a qubit prepared in the eigenstate of Z, disturbs the statistics of Z. A similar unbiased post-measurement disturbance is seen in gbits. For example, measuring X on g 2 deterministically returns α = 1, but the post-measurement state will be an unbiased mixture of g 2 and g 3 . Quantum measurements have both uncertainty and post-measurement disturbance, while GPT states have only disturbance, and no uncertainty.
It was already known 31 that a pair of nonlocally correlated gbits, which form a PR box 33 , can be used for KD using a protocol like the Ekert protocol 2 , and it was conjectured that this would be the case in any non-classical theory. The method we earlier used 25 to convert a deterministic QKD protocol with Bell states into a QSDC protocol by replacing streaming with block-coding, can be adapted to the post-quantum theories by replacing Bell states by PR boxes. Alice prepares a sequence of PR boxes that encode agreed-upon bits. She permutes the particles use a PoP configuration, and transmits the resulting particles to Bob. Bob decodes them after receiving the Π information.
We now show that in a GLT, gbits can be used as a basis for a deterministic GLT-KD (i.e., the GLT version of QKD). More generally, our result applies to the local part of a GNST 31 . We now propose the following deterministic orthogonal-state-based GLT-KD protocol (which we call GLT-2S):
Encoding and Sending: Alice randomly and sequentially generates bit x = 0 or x = 1. In the former case, she transmits g 0 to Bob, while in the latter case, g 3 . Note that g 0 encodes bit x = 0 in both X and Z, while g 3 encodes bit x = 1 in both X and Z. Bob's receipt: Bob measures either X or Z in the received gbit states, to extract the encoded bit deterministically. Computing error rate: Over a public channel, Alice and Bob estimate the error rate on the key so extracted. They publicly agree on certain coordinates of gbits and observables (X or Z) on those gbit coordinates. Bob announces the outcomes on those coordinates. If too many of them are mismatched 34 , they abort the protocol.
Note that the coding in GLT-2S is not like conjugate coding in BB84 or B92, because there is no uncertainty between X and Z in GLT. For the same reason, while a public announcement of bases would be needed in BB84, here none is required, and furthermore, the raw bits generated are automatically the sifted bits. Since the coding states are deterministically distinguishable, and in that sense orthogonal, GLT-2S may be considered as the post-quantum equivalent of the GoldenbergVaidman protocol (GV) 5 . On the other hand, a single gbit in GLT is spatially localized, making it similar to BB84 in this sense, rather than to GV. In GLT-2S, what is remarkable is that security comes from post-measurement disturbance, and not from Heisenberg uncertainty. An eavesdropper Eve (limited by the theory to only be able to perform the stated fiducial measurements 35 ) can deterministically extract the encoded bit by measuring either X or Z, but she will disturb the other observable, which can be detected in the error detection step. If Eve measured n gbits in either X or Z basis, she extracts n bits of information, but she disturbs the other fiducial observable. If Bob measures that during the error check (which he does with probability 1 2 ), he and Alice detect the attack with probability 1 2 . Thus, the probability that Eve can launch this attack and not be detected is 1 − n over n gbits. This exponential drop implies unconditional security against an Eve restricted to attacking single gbits. In Eq. (10), if instead we use a GLT with 3 fiducial measurements, and a similar GLT-KD with two states, this would be analogous to the six-state protocol 36 , and Eve's corresponding probability to escape detection will fall faster, given by p esc = 2 3 n . Generally, with a GLT where gbits are of the
n , indicating that in this sense a protocol is more secure in a theory with more fiducial measurements and outcomes. A more detailed account of the security of GLT-2S is discussed by us elsewhere 34 .
Conclusions and discussions
Security in quantum cryptography has contributions from both Heisenberg uncertainty and post-measurement disturbance, while in GLT-2S, it comes only from disturbance. Intrinsic randomness, which lies at the heart of nonclassicality 37 , can manifest both in uncertainty and post-measurement disturbance. Our work here, as also elsewhere 34 suggests that only the randomness concerned with disturbance is essential to cryptographic security, though that concerned with uncertainty can quantitatively modify the secure limit. A few orthogonal-state-based protocols of secure quantum communication have been proposed in the recent past. Some of them were designed for the stronger security requirement of QSDC, while some others are suitable only for QKD. A link between them is established here by providing reductive security proofs for orthogonal-state-based cryptography protocols. Specifically, it was shown that a secure protocol of QSDC can be converted to a secure protocol of QKD by messaging a key (key-reduction), while a protocol of QKD can be transformed to a protocol of QSDC by using block-transmission and PoP (block-reduction). In condition (3), since I ′ (A:E) asymptotically vanishes, we expect that the condition will hold good even when e ′ 0 (the secure threshold for QSDC) drops well below the QKD threshold e 0 , and indeed, becomes arbitrarily small. A derivation of this will be interesting both practically and foundationally.
As far as we know, the protocol GLT-2S that we proposed here appears to be the first effort to design an (orthogonal-state-based) cryptographic protocol for a local post-quantum theory. Related work has been either about a post-quantum non-signaling 38 or signaling 39 Eve attacking a quantum protocol, or a protocol in a post-quantum nonlocal theory 40 . GLT-2S is interesting from a foundational perspective as it provides a clearer insight into the origin of security in quantum mechanics, without reference to nonlocality.
